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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DIAMOND T. UTAH, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintif /-Appellant,

v.

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMP ANY, a corporation authorized to
do business in the State of Utah,
PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., a corporation authorized to do business in
the State of Utah

Case No.
10951

Defendants-Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant-Respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company,
petition this Court under Rule 76 (e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, for rehearing and re-argument of the aboveentitled matter. This court erred in its decision of this
matter dated the 20th day of May, 1968, in the following
particulars :
POINT I
THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE
"SIDE AGREEMENTS" BETWEEN DIAMOND
T AND PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION IS
1

NOT SUPPORTED BY A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE, PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY
DEPOSITION IN THE RECORD HEREIN AND
THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION IS CONTRARY TO DIAMOND T UTAH'S PLEADINGS
AND CONTENTIONS AND CONTRARY TO
PACIFIC FINANCE COMPANY'S CONTENTIONS AND THIS COURT INCORRECTLY
STATES CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SAID "SIDE
AGREEMENTS" AS FOLLOWS: (1) "THERE
EXISTS SOME 'SIDE AGREEMENT' BETWEEN DIAMOND T AND PACIFIC AND
THERE IS NO DISPUTE ABOUT THE FACT
THAT WHENEVER A VEHICLE WAS REPOSSESSED DIAMOND T HAD THE DUTY
TO IMMEDIATELY TAKE IT OVER AND BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR IT." (2) "APPELLANT,
(DIAMOND T) STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY
REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT WITH
PACIFIC," (3) "IN ADDITION TO ACCEPTING THE PAPER AND COLLECTING THE
PAYMENTS THE PACIFIC FINANCE, INC.
HELPED TO LOCATE VEHICLES UPON
WHICH PAYMENTS HAD BECOME DELINQUENT," AND (4) "THE RECORD IS SILENT
AS TO WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE
NEXT PERIOD OF TIME (AFTER REPOSSION BY PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION,
THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER). THIS INTERREGNUM WAS SHATTERED WHEN THE VEHICLE BECAME INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT AND WAS WRECKED."
POINT II
THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE,
PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY DEPOSITION
IN THE RECORD HEREIN WHICH SUPPORTS
2

THIS COURT'S "PREMISE THAT APPELLANT
STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY REASON OF
ITS SIDE AGREEMENT WITH PACIFIC
FINANCE CORPORATION AFTER REPOSSESSION." THE "CLEAR" LANGUAGE OF
THE INSURANCE POLICY WHICH IS "NOT
SUSCEPTIBLE TO MORE THAN ONE INTERPRETATION" AS DECIDED BY THIS COURT
HEREIN DOES NOT PERMIT A CONCLUSION
THAT DIAMOND T'S "INSURABLE INTEREST," WAS COVERED BY THE POLICY.
POINT III
THIS COURT'S DECISION HEREIN IMPROPERLY APPLIES RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE TO THE RECORD HEREIN BY DECIDING: "ONE GENUINE ISSUE OF
FACT REMAINS, TO-WIT: WHETHER THE
VEHICLE IN QUESTION WAS ... STOLEN ...
OR DRIVEN AWAY ... WITH THE CONSENT
OF THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER .... SHOULD
IT BE ASCERTAINED THAT THE VEHICLE
WAS STOLEN.... THEN ON THE PREMISE
THAT APPELLANT STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY
BY REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT ...
PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER." THERE ARE
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN THE RECORD CONCERNING THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE "SIDE AGREEMENTS" WHEN THIS
COURT CONSTRUES THEM CONTRARY TO
THE CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT,
DIAMOND T, WHICH RESPONDENT, TRAVELERS, HAS TO ACCEPT WHEN MAKING A
MOTION TO DISMISS WHICH IS TREATED
AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
UNDER RULES 12 (b) and 56, UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
REHEARING
POINT I

THE COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE
"SIDE AGREEMENTS" BETWEEN DIAMOND
T AND PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A SCINTILLA OF
EVIDENCE, PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY
DEPOSITION IN THE RECORD HEREIN AND
THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION IS CONTRARY TO DIAMOND T UTAH'S PLEADINGS
AND CONTENTIONS AND CONTRARY TO
PACIFIC FINANCE COMPANY'S CONTENTIONS AND THIS COURT INCORRECTLY
STATES
CONCLUSIONS
ABOUT "SIDE
AGREEMENTS" AS FOLLOWS: (1) "THERE
EXISTS SOME 'SIDE AGREEMENT' BETWEEN DIAMOND T AND PACIFIC AND
THERE IS NO DISPUTE ABOUT THE FACT
THAT WHENEVER A VEHICLE WAS REPOSSESSED DIAMOND T HAD THE DUTY
TO IMMEDIATELY TAKE IT OVER AND BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR IT." (2) "APPELLANT,
(DIAMOND T) STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY
REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT WITH
PACIFIC," (3) "IN ADDITION TO ACCEPTING THE PAPER AND COLLECTING THE
PAYMENTS THE PACIFIC FINANCE, INC.,
HELPED TO LOCATE VEHICLES UPON
WHICH PAYMENTS HAD BECOME DELINQUENT," AND ( 4) "THE RECORD IS SILENT
AS TO WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE
NEXT PERIOD OF TIME (AFTER REPOSSES4

SION BY PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION,
THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER). THIS INTERREGNUM WAS SHATTERED WHEN THE
VEHICLE BECAME INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT AND WAS WRECKED."
The "side agreements" which were casually mentioned in this Court's opinion and which were a keystone
in resolving this matter must have been the written contracts between Pacific Finance Corporation and Diamond
T Utah. The contracts concern Pacific Finance Company's purchase of Diamond T's paper. The agreements
appear to be inconsistent. The affect of the intent and
conduct of the parties to the agreements is important.
Pacific Finance and Diamond T disputed their respective
rights, interests, duties and liabilities under the agreements
up until the day before oral argument. Pacific Finance
and Diamond T compromised and settled their differences
at that time and appellant's action against Pacific has been
dismissed. Travelers was compelled to accept Diamond
T's construction of the "side agreements" when it made
its motion to dismiss.
The "side agreements" did not create a material issue
of fact if construed according to appellant Diamond T's
contentions and the uncontroverted record. Any other construction, including this Court's, which is contrary to Diamond T's position and to this record causes material issues
of facts in the record concerning the construction of the
"side agreements."
In this case the record reveals the following intent,
conduct and agreements between Diamond T and Pacific
which do not support this Court's construction of the "side
agreements."
After Diamond T conditionally sold the vehicle to David
Scott under the conditional sales contract at page 146 of
5

this record, it assigned all of its seller's interest or title to
the truck to Pacific Finance Corporation by a written assignment entitled "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement." That assignment was printed on the back of the
conditional sales contract. The assignment is at page 148
of this record. The conditional sales contract and assignment were executed by Diamond T on January 23, 1961.
In part, the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement"
reads:
"For Value Received, I hereby sell, assign and
transfer unto PACIFIC FINANCE CORPORATION, its Subsidiaries or Affiliates (hereinafter
called assignee) the within described contract, title
to, and the property in said contract mentioned; I
guarantee, warrant and agree to def end the title
to said property against all lawful claims and demands ; I agree that if the assignee shall repossess
said property for failure of the purchaser to perform
any of the conditions of said contract, and shall
deliver said property to my place of business within
ninety ( 90) days after the due date of the oldest unpaid instalment (excluding pickup payments and
time property required to be held for legal sale,
where required by state law) per contract, I will
pay the balance remaining under said contract within ( 30) days after delivery or on demand at election
of assignee; but no such delivery shall be required
to be made to me if at the time of such repossession
I am no longer in the automobile business or am
deemed by the assignee to be an unsafe risk, in
either of which events the assignee shall have full
right to sell such property as provided in said contract and I will upon demand pay to the assignee
all sums provided in said contract to be paid by the
purchaser after sale. Should the automobile be
repossessed solely as the result of one accidental
collision or overturning, then I shall be relieved of
6

my liability hereunder up to the amount of the cost
of repairing the damage done by said collision or
overturning only, not to exceed, however, the sound
value of the property at the time collision or overturning. I understand that title to said property
remains in the assignee until the contract balance
shall be fully paid, and I agree that in the event of
my failure to pay the amounts herein agreed to be
paid in the event of deliyery of said property to my
place of business, or in the event I am deemed by
the assignee to be an unsafe risk, then in either
event the assignee may take possession and make
sale of the property as in the contract provided.
* * *" (Emphasis added.)
Appellant, Diamond T, argued, plead and by its president testified that the repurchase provisions of the assignment did not become operative prior to the loss of the
vehicle because Pacific did not deliver the vehicle to it at
Salt Lake or the place of repossession within the "ninety
(90) days" recited in the "Assignment and Repurchase
Agreement." It has continuously been Diamond T's position
that delivery of the vehicle within "ninety (90) days after
due date of the oldest unpaid installment" is a condition
precedent to Diamond T's obtaining or regaining legal title
to the vehicle. Diamond T has always contended that it
did not obtain or regain title to the vehicle before the vehicle
was damaged while in possession of the conditional
purchaser.
At paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 Diamond T's second
amended complaint (R-23) Diamond T pleads:
"7. That the assignment and Repurchase
Agreement on the conditional sales contract provides ... 'I, (Diamond T Utah, Inc.) agree that if
the assignee (Pacific Finance, Inc.) shall repossess
said property for failure of the purchaser to per7

form any of the conditions of said contract, and shall
deliver said property to my place of business within
ninety (90) days after the due date of the oldest
unpaid instalment (excluding pickup payments and
time property required to be held for legal sale,
where required by state law) per contract, I will
pay the balance remaining under said contract
within thirty ( 30) days after delivery ... ,'
"8. That Pacific Finance Inc .... on the 16th
day of June, 1961, ... attempted to repossess the
unit in Madison, Wisconsin; and after taking possession, parked the same at Chief Auto Parts Body
Shop at 1208 E. Broadway, Madison, Wisconsin, and
failed to store it properly or to obtain storage receipts and credentials from the company the unit
was left with.
"9. That the unit was left unguarded, and the
purchaser, seeing the unit, regained possession of
it and drove it away and sometime later totally
wrecked the same-the value being $22,341.67 less
the salvage value.
"10. That plaintiff has never received the unit

as required, and under the terms of the contract is
not obligated to pay Pacific Finance, Inc. for the
same."
At pages 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Diamond T's brief submitted to this Court and in this record it argues that the
repurchase provisions of the "Assignment and Repurchase
Agreement" did not operate to vest Diamond T with title
prior to the loss of the vehicle. Diamond T's conclusion is
based upon Pacific Finance corporation's failure to deliver
the vehicle to it within "ninety (90) days." It argues that
delivery is a condition precedent to its repurchase of the
vehicle from Pacific. At page 10 of Diamond T's brief the
argument reads :

"If Pacific had meant the unconditional guaran-
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tee contract to be the contract that would govern
the relations of the parties hereto, there would be
no obligation to repossess, but the course of action of
both parties has been to have Pacific repossess the
vehicles and return the possession to appellant prior
to charging appellant under the recourse agreement,
and this conduct would mean that the parties themselves in interpreting their own contracts meant the
assignment and repurchase agreement to be the
operating agreement."
At page 60 of the record, Diamond T submits the following argument:
"The argument that the defendant, Pacific Finance, Inc. has no right to recover is based on the
provision in the assignment and repurchase agreement set forth on the back of the conditional sales
contract which provides that if the assignee defendant, Pacific Finance, Inc., repossesses the
property, that delivery of the property will be made
to the plaintiff before plaintiff is required to repurchase the contract. The exception to this is if a
determination is made that the plaintiff is an unsafe
risk or has quit dealing in automobiles which exception is not pertinent."
"Since the defendant Pacific Finance, Inc., did
not return the repossessed vehicle as it was destroyed prior to its being returned, then the plaintiff
is not liable or responsible for the payment to the
defendant Pacific Finance, Inc., of any monies due
on the contract." (Emphasis Added)
Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson, President of Diamond T, testified
that Diamond T did not receive any interest in the vehicle
before the accident in which the vehicle received damage
while in possession of the conditional purchaser. The
transcript of his deposition relevant to Diamond T's "side
9

agreements" with Pacific begins at page 131 of this record. In part it reads with italics added to emphasize the
incorrect conclusions by this Court, as follows :
THE WITNESS: Well, simply they (Pacific) repossessed-took the truck from the man's possession
and left it.
Q. (By Mr. Callister) Took the truck from whose
possession?
A. I don't know whether it was the owner of the
truck or his driver, but they had the truck in their
possession.
Q. How do you know this?
A. They called me on the phone and told me.
Q. They called you?
A. Yes.
Q. When did they call you?
A. Oh, a day or so after they had gotten it.
Q. Which would be about when?
A. I couldn't tell you exactly what day, but they
gave me that information.
Q. Well, you say that they repossessed it or attempted to repossess it on June 16th?
A. Well, they did repossess it to the best of my
knowledge, and had it in their possession.
Q. They called you a couple of days after June
16th?
A. I couldn't tell you exactly.
Q. Was it after the repossession or attempted repossession?
A. Yes, after.

* * *

And what, to the best of your recollection, what
was the substance of the conversation? What did you
say and what did he say?
A. He just called me and told me that they had repossessed this David Scott unit and their office had
stored it and had sent the keys here (Pacific Finance's office in Salt Lake City).
Q.
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Q. And what did you say?
A. I just told them that was fine. There wasn't
much for me to say. We were trying to get it and
they had gotten it and said they have stored it and
the keys were on the way to this (Pacific Finance's)
office.
Q. Then in Paragraph 9 you allege that the unit
was left unguarded and the purchaser, which would
be, I assume Scott, and then the unit remained in
their possession and they drove it away and some
time later totaled the vehicle-wrecked it. Now,
what facts do you have for these allegations?

*

*

*

Q. Did anyone from Pacific ever tell you those
facts in Paragraph 9?
A. Mark Ames (Pacific's agent in Salt Lake City)
told me that the owner had apparently taken the
truck. I don't think he was sure who had taken it.
Q. When did he tell you this ?
A. Oh, several days after. I wouldn't be able to
tell you just when.
Q. Several days after this last conversation that
you had with him that you refer to?
A. Yes. Also he told me that he had the keys there,

too.

Which he received from Wisconsin?
Yes, from their office wherever it is. I'm not
certain.
Q. Now, do you know what happened to the trailer
or these units that are described? You allege they
were wrecked.
A. Yes. They were totally wrecked. I had them
hauled into Salt Lake.
Q. From where?
A. Oh, Indiana-I have forgotten the name of the
town. I will check that. I have forgotten the name
of the town. It was where they were wrecked. I
believe it was South Bend but I'm not absolutely
certain.
Q.

A.
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Do you know who wrecked the units?
A. Well, Scott was hurt pretty bad and he was in
the hospital. I guess he was there. I don't have any
way of knowing.
Q. Now, how did you get possession of these units?
A. I got them from the garage, picked them up.
Q. You did this yourself?
A. I didn't, no. I sent a truck.
Q. I mean, you or your agents?
A. Yes.
Q. And Pacific Finance had nothing to do with
that?
A. They told me where they were. Their people
went there and checked them out and found everything out about them and told me they had insurance
on them and when we found out the policy in the file,
it had elapsed, and so when this determined that
there was no insurance-it went on for several
months, and fina,lly I picked them (tractor-trailer)
up at their (Pacific's) request.
Q. Now, in paragraph 10 you allege that Pacific
Finance ... deducted , .. the balance on the vehicles
at the time.
Q.

Q.

* * *

. .. You claim that they deducted the value from

your reserves and charged this to your account, is
that correct?
A. That's right.

* *

You claim they didn't have that right?
A. Well, I claim that they (Pacific) have a further
responsibility of this unit.
Q. What?
A. And there has never been a settlement on it to
whose responsibility it is. (Pacific or Diamond T)
Q.

* * *

(R-139 line 2) :
Q. Now, in paragraph 11, Mr. Wilkinson, you allege
that Pacific Finance was negligent in repossessing
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the vehicle and leaving it parked by the side of the
road unguarded without obtaining proper storage receipts, credentials, from the company that the unit
was stored with. Now, where did you get this information?
A. Well, Pacific Finance office couldn't give me
any receipts whatsoever for storing it. They left it
with somebody and that was all they knew about it.
Q.

A.

* * *

(By Mr. Callister) What basis was that?
Pacific Finance had no receipts of storage."

Mr. Wilkinson testified at another deposition. His following testimony commences at page 162 of the record:
"Q. Now when did you first learn that Mr. Scott
was delinquent in his payments to Pacific Finance?
A. I wouldn't be able to tell you.
Q. Would it be sometime after they (Pacific) repossessed it?
A. Oh no, several months before. He was delinquent for several months before they repossessed it.
He was in a very bad delinquent situation for a
month or two while they (Pacific) were trying to
find it and they (Pacific) couldn't even find it.
Q. I think your attorney has set out in his complaint that the repossession took place on June 16,
1961, in Madison, Wisconsin; would that be correct
as near as you recall?
A. Yes.
Q. Had you made any attempt to locate Mr. Scott
and have him bring these delinquencies current?
A. Well they always advise me and I ordinarily do
try to help locate him but whether I had talked to
him or not I don't remember.
Q. Do you ever remember that you talked to him
about the time of the repossession?
A. I talked to him the day following the repossession.
Q. Was that by telephone?
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A.

Yes.
Where was he at that time as near as you can
remember?
A. I think he was in Edgerton, Wisconsin, but I
am not absolutely certain.
Q. Edgerton?
A. Yes. I think he had some people that lived there.
And they secured the truck from a driver, repossessed it from his driver.
Q. When you say "they,'' are you referring to Pacific Finance?
A. Pacific Finance, yes.
Q. And then right after it was repossessed did he
call you on the telephone?
A. The following day he called me.
Q. What was the substance of the conversation as
near as you can remember?
A. He wanted to know what he had to do to get the
truck back.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. I told him he had to bring Pacific Finance up to
date and that whatever they decided there, whatever
Pacific Finance decided would be agreeable with me,·
but that he would have to contact them (Pacific)
and bring them up to date.
Q.

* *

Do you remember saying . . . to him, 'Get the
unit back on the road and see if you can keep it
operating'?
A. No, sir, I never did tell him to get the unit back
on the road without payment. I told him that the
first thing he bad to do was bring the payments
up to date.
Q. Was anything else said as near as you can remember in that conversation?
A. No. As I remember he did not have enough
money to pay it up to date in full and so I told him
he would have to go to Pacific Finance and work out
whatever he wanted to do with them and that would

Q.
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be the only way that the truck could be released, that
I would not release it and could not release it, and
that it was up to Pacific Finance to handle it. He
called me one Saturday morning.
Q. Did you notify Pacific Finance of this telephone
call?
A. Yes, I did Monday. They were not open on Saturday.
Q. Do you know if he ever made any contact with
Pacific Finance on the payments?
A. I don't know whether he did or not. The next
thing I knew Pacific Finance notified me that the
truck had been taken from the lot and they were
trying to run it down to find out what had happened
to it and who got it and whether it was him, or what
happened.
Q. Do you know anything about the details of the
repossession?
A. No.
Q. Have you heard anything about it from Pacific
Finance?
A. No. The only thing I know is that they repossessed it from a driver. I don't know the details.
And I understood they stored it in a parking lot.
Q. When you say a driver, you mean they repossessed it from a driver of Scott's?
A. Yes. Scott was not on the truck when it was
repossessed as I understand it.
Q. Do you know whether they instituted any legal
proceedings to effect the repossession?
A. I don't know whether they did or not. I doubt
that they did.
Q. You just heard they in effect took it from one
of his drivers?
A. They just called me and told me they had picked
it up and it was stored in-I don't remember, some
little town in Wisconsin as I remember-and that
their office was mailing the keys and all, their storage receipt and everything to them here. And I
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told them, well when they got that, then I would go
ahead and make arrangements to have it picked up.

* * *

The keys may have been left in it?
A. The keys were sent to Pacific Finance. Whether
there was an extra key left or not I don't know; but
a set of keys for it was sent to Pacific Finance."
Q.

Both Pacific Finance Corporation and Diamond T Utah
admitted that there were certain other agreements between
them. They contended that all of the relevant agreements
are found at pages 144, 145, 146, 147 and 148 of the record
herein. In addition to the conditional sales contract with
the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement" on the back,
they had a written "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement"
and "Agreement to Furnish Insurance and Agreement to
Furnish Ownership Certificate."
The "Unconditional Guarantee" agreement provided:
"I (or we), hereby agree that, notwithstanding any
assignments appearing on any conditional sales contract or any other existing agreements between myself and Pacific Finance Corporation, my assignments shall be deemed an unconditional guarantee
assignment on any contract of conditional sale hereafter assigned to and purchased by Pacific Finance
Corporation from me, * * *
The "Agreement to Furnish Insurance and Agreement
to Furnish Ownership Certificate" provided that Diamond
T would cause insurance "with long form loss payable endorsement in Pacific Finance's favor" (R-147). It further
provided that Diamond T would deliver title documents of
the vehicles sold under conditional sale contracts which
were assigned to Pacific showing the purchaser as owner and
Pacific as lienholder (R-147). The conditions for Diamond
T's furnishing Pacific with title documents does not con16

flict with the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement." The
condition for furnishing insurance with Pacific as loss
payee was inconsistent with Diamond T's contention that the
conditional purchaser, Scott, or in the alternative, Pacific
had the duty to cause insurance before Pacific could collect
under the "Unconditional Guarantee." Both Pacific and
Diamond T intended that collision insurance with Scott as
named insured and with Pacific as loss payee would cover
the damage to the vehicle herein. Such a policy was purchased but Pacific and Scott permitted it to lapse prior to
the wreck. Diamond T did not claim Traveler's policy herein
covered the loss until it found that the only policy which
could have covered the loss had lapsed.
The record clearly supports Diamond T's construction
of the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement." The facts
and law support Pacific Finance Corporation's contentions
concerning the "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement" with
Diamond T. There was no "Repurchase" by Diamond T and
Pacific collected from Diamond T under an "Unconditional
Guarantee." The record does not support this Court's construction of the "side agreements." This Court creates a
material issue of fact by interjecting a construction peculiar
to any position heretofore taken by the parties.
Neither Travelers nor Diamond T contended "there is
no dispute about the fact that whenever a vehicle was repossessed Diamond T had the duty to immediately take it over
and be responsible for it." And, the record is not silent concerning relevant events after repossession. There was no
relevant "interregnum." Both appellant, Diamond T, and
respondent, Travelers, contended that Pacific had the only
right and duty to repossess the vehicle. Diamond T contended that it had no duty nor interest in the vehicle until
Pacific returned the vehicle to it within the "ninety (90)
day" period in the "Assignment and Repurchase Agree-
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ment." There was no relevant "interregnum" or pause in
the series of events or in the control of the vehicle by the
parties with an interest in the property. Diamond T Utah,
by 0. J. Wilkinson, admitted at his deposition that he had
no right or power to release the truck to Scott. Pacific
Finance Corporation allegedly collected the balance owing
on the conditional sales contract under the "Unconditional
Guarantee Agreement." Pacific did not demand the balance of Scott's obligation until after the wreck. And,
Diamond T's payment under the "Unconditional Guarantee
Agreement" had nothing to do with any interest in the
security. No reassignment or scintilla of a reassignment to
Diamond T was made before the wreck of the vehicle.
Diamond T did contend that it had an insurable interest
as a result of the unconditional guarantee agreement between Pacific and Diamond T. The record does not support
any conclusion that Diamond T obtained any insurable interest in the vehicle as a result of the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement" because it was not delivered to Diamond
T or Diamond T did not take possession of the vehicle at any
place it was being held by Pacific until after the vehicle sustained damage in the "wreck." The record supports and
Diamond T admits that Diamond T was not vested with any
legal title or property interest in the vehicle prior to the
wreck. This Court has decided that a conditional seller
loses all interest in the chattel sold or in the conditional sales
contract when the conditional seller assigns his interest to a
third party, Stains v. Peterson, 74 Utah 256, 279 P. 53
(1929), and Harrison v. Otto Securities Company, 70 Utah
11, 257 P. 677 (1927). The guarantee agreement does not
create a property right nor reserve one to Diamond T after
Diamond T assigned the contract to Pacific.
Pacific Finance Corporation contended that under the
terms of the "Continuing Unconditional Guarantee Agree18

ment" the finance company was empowered to release the
security at its discretion and that it owed no duty whatsoever to Diamond T for the insurance coverage of the security or for the exercise of proper control over the security
(R-25-27). Pacific Finance Corporation correctly concludes
at page 23 of its brief:
"Under the ... Unconditional Guarantee Agreement,
the ownership would be irrelevant, since Pacific
was empowered to release the security completely."
Diamond T entered into the "Continuing Unconditional
Guarantee Agreement" with Pacific to induce it to purchase
its conditional sales contracts. The primary inducement to
Pacific was Diamond T's waiver of any rights it had in the
security under any assignment it had made or would make
to Pacific. Diamond T promised Pacific that it would absolutely and unconditionally guarantee a conditional purchaser's obligation under a conditional sales contract without
regard to any duty or condition precedent imposed upon
Pacific in the "Assignment and Repurchase Agreement" on
the back of the contracts Pacific purchased. Pacific's construction of the contracts is supported by decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In
Heaston Tractor and Implement Co. v. Securities Acceptance
Co., (CA-10) 243 F.2d 197 (1952), and U.S. v. Newton
Livestock Option Market, (CA-10), 336 F.2d 673 (1964),
the Court construed "unconditional guarantee agreements."
In both cases the guarantors, defendants, contended that the
creditors, plaintiffs, had increased the risk of liability on
the guarantee agreements by failure to exercise due care in
protecting the security the guarantors' principals had given
the creditors, plaintiffs. In both cases the court held that
the guarantors had waived all interest in the security by the
unconditional guarantees. That is exactly what happened
in the case at bar. Diamond T changed its arrangements
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-with Pacific from one of "Repurchase," with certain conditions which never occurred herein imposed upon Pacific, to
one of "Unconditional Guarantee" whereby Diamond T
waived all interest in the security and unconditionally guaranteed the obligation of Scott. The only controlling agreement was the "Unconditional Guarantee." Conditions in the
other "side agreements" were waived by it.
The "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement" may be an
insurable interest but it is not an interest insured by the
unambiguous language in the policy. The policy covered
automobiles in the possession of Diamond T as owner or
consignee and held for sale. Diamond T did not regain
possession of the vehicle nor an interest in the vehicle after
repossession nor before the wreck. Diamond T did not suffer
any loss as a result of the wreck because it didn't have any
interest in the vehicle. Diamond T's liability on the "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement" was a liability on contract
which had nothing to do with the security for Scott's obligation under the conditional sales contract.
POINT II
THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE,
PLEADING OR TESTIMONY BY DEPOSITION
IN THE RECORD HEREIN WHICH SUPPORTS
THIS COURT'S "PREMISE THAT APPELLANT
STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY REASON OF ITS
SIDE AGREEMENT WITH PACIFIC FINANCE
CORPORATION AFTER REPOSSESSION."
THE "CLEAR" LANGUAGE OF THE INSURANCE
POLICY
WHICH
IS
"NOT
SUSCEPTIBLE TO MORE THAN ONE INTERPRETATION" AS DECIDED BY THIS
COURT HEREIN DOES NOT PERMIT A CONCLUSION THAT DIAMOND T'S "INSURABLE
INTEREST," WAS COVERED BY THE POLICY.
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This Court decided that the language in the policy is
"clear and not susceptible of more than one interpretation."
That clear and unambiguous language defines property covered as follows :
"l. Property Covered-The policy covers automobiles (a) consigned to or owned by the insured
and held for sale or used in the insured's business
as an automobile dealer including repair service or
as demonstrators, exclusive of automobiles leased
or rented to others, and automobiles sold by the insured under bailment le:;i.se, conditional sale, purchase agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance;
... " (Emphases added)

Then, this Court decided that Diamond T may recover
under the policy "on the premise it has an insurable interest"
as a result of the "side agreements" discussed under Point I.
The Court errs in deciding that "an insurable interest" is
covered by the unambiguous language in the policy. An insured should only be entitled to recover if his interest was
insured under the policy.
Pacific had all of the property interest in the vehicle
if it properly repossessed the vehicle at the time of repossession, except for the equitable rights of the purchaser, Scott,
and before it assigned it to Diamond T after the wreck.
Stains v. Peterson, 74 Utah 256, 279 P. 53 (1929); American
States Insurance v. White, 341 Ill. App. Ct. Repts. 422, 94
N.E.2d 95 (1950); and Jensen Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d
276, 323 P.2d 259 (1959).
From the time of repossession until the wreck, Diamond
T never, at any time, owned the vehicle or had the vehicle
consigned to it and "held it for sale."
During the critical period of time, the date of the retaking by Scott or the date of the wreck, Diamond T had no
interest in the property which was within the terms of
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"property covered" in the policy or which was outside the
exclusion of "automobiles .. sold by insured .. " The policy
requires, as a condition precedent to coverage, that Diamond
T be a consignee or owner and have possession of the vehicle at the time of damage. The "side agreements" and
record discussed and quoted in Point I reveal no basis to
conclude the language in the policy covered the vehicle at
the critical time. Meyer v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.
(Texas) 383 S.W2d 625 (1964); Dardeen v. Greyhound
Corporation, (Ky.) 412 S.W.2d 585 (1967) and 23 ALR2d
796 supplemented in 3 ALR2d Later Case Service 578.
In Fountain v. Importers and Exporters Insurance Co.
(Wisc.) 252 N.W. 569 (1934), the plaintiff had a contract
of insurance with the defendant which expressly covered
automobiles subject to a mortgage. The policy did not have
the narrow definition of "property covered" as the policy in
the case at bar. The plaintiff, automobile dealer, had a
financing arrangement with one named Fleming. Fleming
would loan money to Fountain, plaintiff, for the purchase
of automobiles and Fountain would give Fleming a mortgage
on the automobiles. When Fountain conditionally sold automobiles all of the interest in the automobiles was assigned
to the purchaser of the automobile and Fleming. Fountain
would repossess the automobiles from customers in default
and hold them on his lot for sale. Fleming did not reassign
any interest to Fountain while he held the repossessed automobiles for sale. A fire destroyed the repossessed automobiles. The trial court found defendant insurance company
liable on its policy. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed and held that plaintiff, Fountain, the automobile
dealer, had no insurable interest in the cars unless there was
a reassignment before the fire by Fleming to Fountain, the
dealer.
Diamond T contends there was no reassignment before
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the alleged theft or wreck. And, Diamond T's "Unconditional Guarantee Agreement" was a liability separate from
any property interest in the vehicle which is not insured
under Traveler's policy. Hudiburg Chevrolet Inc. v. Globe
Indemnity, (Tex.) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964).
Pacific could have given away the security or waived
any right to it and Diamond T would be liable to Pacific on
the "Unconditional Guarantee." Certainly, Travelers does
not insure Diamond T's liability on the guarantee when it
has no relation to a property or possessory interest in the
vehicle. It appears obvious that Travelers intended to insure
automobiles in the possession of Diamond T as part of
Diamond T's inventory of used vehicles but Travelers did
not intend to insure vehicles sold to third parties as Pacific
or Scott. 23 ALR2d 796.
POINT III
THIS COURT'S DECISION HEREIN IMPROPERLY APPLIES RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE TO THE RECORD HEREIN BY DECIDING: "ONE GENUINE ISSUE OF
FACT REMAINS, TO-WIT: WHETHER THE
VEHICLE IN QUESTION WAS .. STOLEN OR
DRIVEN AWAY .. WITH THE CONSENT OF
THE LEGAL TITLE HOLDER. ... SHOULD IT
BE ASCERTAINED THAT THE VEHICLE WAS
STOLEN ... THEN ON THE PREMISE THAT
APPELLANT STILL RETAINED AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY BY
REASON OF ITS SIDE AGREEMENT . . .
PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER." THERE ARE
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN THE RECORD CONCERNING THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE "SIDE AGREEMENTS" WHEN THIS
COURT CONSTRUES THEM CONTRARY TO
THE CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT,
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DIAMOND T, WHICH RESPONDENT, TRAVELERS, HAS TO ACCEPT WHEN MAKING A
MOTION TO DISMISS WHICH IS TREATED
AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
UNDER RULES 12 (b) and 56, UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Diamond T and Pacific had an action and appeal pending herein before they compromised and settled their differences concerning the construction of the "side agreements."
When Travelers made its motion at the trial court, it
assumed that Diamond T's construction of the Conditional
Sale Contract, Assignment and Repurchase Agreement and
Unconditional Guarantee Agreement was true except where
unsupported in the record or in law.
Diamond T contended that it did not have any right,
title or interest in the vehicle after it assigned the conditional
sales contract to Pacific and before the loss occurred (See
quotation of record under Point I) . Pacific made a clear
and convincing record that Diamond T did not have any
right, title or interest after Pacific received the assignment
and before the loss. Pacific claimed the "Unconditional
Guarantee Agreement" was totally unrelated to an interest
in the vehicle and Diamond T and Pacific contended Pacific
did not reassign the title or contract to Diamond T before
loss.
The only contention Diamond T made about the "side
agreements" which Travelers denied (R-15, 16) and which
the record unequivocally controverts is that the vehicle was
in the constructive possession of Diamond T when Pacific
repossessed it. Oral J. Wilkinson pierced that allegation
when he testified that Diamond T never received any possession of the vehicle prior to its being damaged.
Clearly, this court's construction of the side agreements,
which were the subject matter of Diamond T's cause of
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action against Pacific, involved issues of fact. The whole
relationship between Diamond T and Pacific out of which
an interest in the vehicle may or may not arise involved
issues of fact if that relationship is construed contrary to
the inferences permitted by the uncontested issues of fact
between the parties.
It would be unjust to bind Travelers to this court's
construction of the "side agreements" which is contrary
to Diamond T's theory. At a trial of the issue concerning the
construction of the side agreements, Travelers would be
able to use a substantial part of this record to cause Diamond
T to admit to its construction of the "side agreements" or to
impeach.
Under Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court
correctly decided herein that it is not bound to rule for one
side or the other when both sides move for summary judgment if a genuine issue of fact exists. A trial must ensue
as to any remaining disputed fact issue, and, according to
the decision cited by this court in support of its construction
of Rule 56, Travelers should be allowed to show a material
issue of fact exists in the construction of the "side agreements."
In the decision cited by this Court, Walling v. Richmond
Screw Anchor Co. (CA-2), 154 F.2d 780, (1946), both
parties moved for summary judgment. The court said:

"* * * Although a defendant may, on his own
motion, assert that, accepting his legal theory, the
facts are undisputed, he may be able and should always be allowed to show that, if plaintiffs legal
theory be adopted, a genuine dispute as to a material
fact exists."
Pursuant to the authority cited by this Court, Travelers
should not be prevented from proving that the "side agreements" should be construed according to Diamond T's contentions, the record herein and the trial court's construction.
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Lynch v. Webb City School Dist. (Mo.) 418 SW 2d 608, 617
(1967). According to this court's discussions of Rule 56 in
Christensen v. Finance Service Co. 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d
1010 (1963) ; Lundberg v. Backman, 9 Utah 2d 58, 337 P.2d
433 (1959) ; and Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81,
395 P.2d 918 (1964), Travelers was compelled to rely upon
Diamond T's interpretation of its agreements with Pacific
in connection with its motion before the trial court.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company, respectfully submits this court grant a rehearing and reargument
and correct the conclusions of this court which are not
permitted by the law applicable hereto or the record herein.
Respectfully submitted,
L. RIDD LARSON of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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